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Abstract  
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) latest reports indicate a growing 
number of states (newcomers) considering the deployment of nuclear energy programs. In 
developing nuclear infrastructure, newcomers have to employ the prevailing standards to deploy 
the nuclear program in a secure, safe, and sustainable manner. State-Level Concept (SLC) refers 
to a comprehensive approach that uses information about a state’s nuclear facilities and 
capabilities to implement safeguards within the scope of the state’s safeguards agreement. SLC 
focuses on strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards system 
considering the State as whole. SLC has been implemented in 53 states, and the IAEA is 
encouraging other states to implement SLC. This paper investigates the influence of SLC on 
newcomers, with the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) as a case study. The investigation 
approaches SLC from the newcomer’s perspective, with the aim of determining critical factors 
impacting newcomers’ successful implementation of SLC. KSA has in force, the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA) with no Additional 
Protocol (AP), and Small Quantities Protocol (SQP) and has a small unit for the State System of 
Accounting for and Control of nuclear material (SSAC). Critical looks at State-level objectives 
and State-specific factors are employed to reconcile KSA’s outlook with the IAEA’s safeguards 
framework/agreements. The factors impacting SLC include sufficient cooperation between the 
IAEA and newcomer states, raised confidence in sensitive nuclear plant management, higher 
transparency of the civilian nuclear energy program, and improved capabilities of SSAC. For 
KSA to achieve its initial nuclear capacity (18 GWe) by 2032–40, it is recommended that KSA 
improve and expand its SSAC to adequately meet safeguard responsibilities. In addition, KSA is 
encouraged to sign the AP, which enables the IAEA to draw broader safeguard conclusions on 
nuclear materials and activities. This will foster transparency and long-term nuclear cooperation 
between KSA and developed states. 
Keyword: State-Level Concept (SLC), Newcomer States, Safeguards Evolution, Broader 
Safeguards Conclusion, Nuclear Transparency 
1. Introduction 
The International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) latest reports indicate a growing 
number of “newcomer” states considering the deployment of nuclear energy programs. The 
states look to nuclear technology to address increasing electricity demand driven by population 
growth and limited energy resources.
1
 The expected projections in nuclear energy demand are 1) 
17% if the current market remains and few changes in resources and technology occur, 2) 94% if 
the rate of electricity demand and economies continue to grow.
1
 The consideration of civilian 
nuclear power programs comes with the necessity of having acceptable safeguards protocols in 
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place before deployment. The types of safeguards commitments and agreements reflect on the 
state-level nuclear transparency and the confidence of the international nuclear community, 
especially during the sensitive stages of the nuclear fuel cycle. Development in nuclear 
safeguards has continued since the creation of the IAEA in 1957, as well as the establishment of 
the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and comprehensive safeguards agreement (CSA) in 
the 1970s.
2,3
 The CSA, based on INFCIRC/153 criteria, “called traditional safeguards”, was 
proven to have limitations that prevent the IAEA from carrying out its duties sufficiently and 
effectively.
2-4
 The discovery of the clandestine Iraqi nuclear weapon program in the 1990s 
triggered the alarm for strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiencies of the 
safeguards system.
3,5
 Many lessons were learned in the Iraqi case – and subsequently in DPRK, 
Libya and Iran – that pushed for continuous evolution of the safeguards system.
2
 Since then, the 
IAEA has been giving greater consideration to the state as a whole. The Additional Protocol 
(AP) was adopted in 1997.
6
 AP equipped the IAEA with the needed tool (broader information, 
wider environmental sampling, complementary access, and short notice) to verify, deter by 
timely detection, and provide assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities.
3-6
 
Moreover, AP allowed the IAEA to draw broader safeguards conclusions.
2,3
 Consequently, the 
ratification of NPT along with maintaining acceptable safeguards commitments and agreements 




 1.1. SLC Development and Methodology 
The integrated safeguards (IS) and state-level concept (SLC) were the concepts 
developed by the IAEA for the consideration of the state as whole.
4
 The IS refers to the best 
combination of safeguards measures that is available to the IAEA under CSA and AP.
4
 The 
implementation of IS is achieved only once the IAEA has drawn the broader safeguards 
conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear material, facilities, and activities in the 
concerned state.
4
 The IAEA can draw the broader safeguards conclusion only if both CSA and 
AP are in force.
8,9
 Thus, IS is limited to the type of safeguards agreements. The implementation 
of IS is achieved if all the needed evaluations have been completed. SLC was introduced for the 
first time in safeguard implementation report (SIR) 2004.
8
 Since then, SLC has played an 
important part in strengthening the effectiveness and improving the efficiency of the safeguards 
system.
8,9
 As defined by the IAEA, SLC refers to the implementation of safeguards in a manner 
that considers a state’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole, within 
the scope of the state’s safeguards agreement [GOV/2013/38 and GOV/2014/41].
8,9
 SLC does 
not present any additional rights or obligations to the party states of NPT and CSA and no 
modification in the existing rights and obligations.
8,9
 SLC is applicable to states with all different 
types of safeguards agreements. SLC considers the capability of the state’s nuclear fuel cycle, the 
technical capability of the state/regional system of accounting for and control of nuclear material 
(SSAC/RSAC), all safeguards relevant information, and the nature of safeguards conclusion.
8,9
 
Additionally, SLC is not used to rate or grade states and is not a substitute for AP. SLC has been 
implemented in 53 states, and the IAEA is encouraging other states to join.
8
  
SLC involves development of the state-level approaches (SLA). SLA addresses the 
generic safeguards objectives common to all states with CSA agreements while taking into 
account the state-specific factors.
8,9
 In addition, SLA addresses the state-level objectives 
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1) The detection of any undeclared nuclear material and activities in the state as a 
whole, 
2) The detection of any undeclared production or processing of nuclear material in 
declared facilities or in location outside facilities (LOF),  
3) The detection of any diversion of declared nuclear materials in declared facilities or 
LOFs.
 
The determination of state-level objectives is based on conducting diversion/acquisition 
path analysis that takes into account the state-specific factors.
8,9




1) The type of safeguards agreement in force and the nature of the safeguards 
conclusion drawn by the IAEA;  
2) The nuclear fuel cycle and related technical capabilities of the state;  
3) The technical capabilities of SSAC/RSAC; 
4) The IAEA’s ability to implement certain safeguard measures in the state;  
5) The nature and scope of the cooperation between the IAEA and the state;  
6) The IAEA experience in implementing safeguards in the state. 
 The various aspects involved in the development of SLC positively impact the 
effectiveness and efficiencies of safeguards implementation. Newcomers must recognize the 
importance of developing SLA and SLC in early stages of nuclear infrastructure development. 
Thorough collaboration is required between the IAEA and the state in order to elevate nuclear 
transparency. The technical capabilities of SSAC/RSAC in the development of SLC allow for 
tight cooperation and improve the newcomer’s SSAC/RSAC. Another benefit of the SLC is the 
building of confidence in the state’s sensitive nuclear facilities through the concentration of the 
safeguards effort on key areas.  
2. Scope of Work: Justification and Significance 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the SLC’s impacts on newcomer states, with KSA 
as a case study. Critical looks at state-level objectives and state-specific factors are employed in 
reconciling KSA’s current outlook with the IAEA’s safeguards framework/agreements. The 
implementation of SLC has not been addressed in details since such details must involve IAEA 
and KSA. The review is mainly concerned with the factors considered as positive influences that 
ultimately strengthen the effectiveness and improve the efficiency of safeguards, as demonstrated 
by previous implementation of SLC. This is due to the fact that SLC is already governed by 
existing safeguards commitments, “CSA and AP if applicable”, and it neither introduces new 
rights and obligations nor involves new interpretation of existing authorities. It should be noted 
that IAEA has addressed discriminatory and/or political (i.e. negative) factors that may lead to 
objection to SLC in IAEA documents GOV/2013/38 and GOV/2014/41. 
3. KSA’s Proposed Civilian Nuclear Power Program 
 The Gulf States, namely, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA), United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and Oman, are considering the deployment of civilian nuclear 
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 The countries’ different interests lead to separate efforts to seek civilian 
nuclear power programs.
10
 In 2010, KSA officially announced its consideration of a civilian 
nuclear power program along with the creation of King Abdullah City for Atomic and 
Renewable Energy (KACARE), KSA’s representative to the IAEA.
11
 KACARE’s 
responsibilities include the planning, formation and deployment of the KSA civilian nuclear 
power program along with other renewable resources.
11
  
Table 1: Specifications of the Proposed KSA Civilian Nuclear Power Program 
KSA   Parameter Specifications  
   
Nuclear Capacity 
 









Name-Characterization Electricity Production (MWe) 









Nuclear Fuel Cycle  
 
Options or Scenarios 
1—The nuclear fuel will be imported 
2—The nuclear fuel will be manufactured 


















Source: World Nuclear Association. 2016. Nuclear Power in Saudi Arabia.
11 
a
, Non-Proliferation activities are limited, list does not include all conventions. 
b
, KSA has not yet signed the AP.  
 KACARE has been involved in various international agreements for evaluating and 
planning the deployment of a civilian nuclear power program.
11
 KACARE has concluded 
agreements with the following entities: 1) Areva, France in 2011; 2) Investigación Aplicada 
(INVAP), Argentina in 2011; 3) South Korea Atomic Energy Research Institute (KAERI), South 
Korea in 2011 and 2015; 4) China Nuclear Engineering Corporation (CNEC), China in 2012; 5) 
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Finnish Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority (STUK), Finland in 2014; 6) Rosatom State 
Nuclear Energy Corporation, Russia in 2015; and 6) Hungary in 2015.
11
 In terms of nuclear 
capacity, KACARE announced the projection of 16 power reactors.
11
 The proposed numbers of 
power reactors will provide at least 17 to 18 GWe by 2032–40 (see Table 1).
11
 In KACARE’s 
initial plan, the first two power reactors will start operation by 2022, followed by one or two 
reactors subsequently added each year until the complete deployment of 16 reactors.
11
 To date, 
there is no official announcement of a type of power reactor, but the Evolutionary Power Reactor 
(EPR), a 1600 MWe, and AP1000, a 1000 MWe, have been proposed (see Table 1).
11
 The 
considered research reactors are System-integrated Modular Advanced Reactor (SMART) and 
CAREM for the purpose of human capabilities development as well desalination.
11
  
The KSA has no nuclear fuel cycle capabilities.
11
 The proposed KSA nuclear fuel cycle 
may involve three options: 1) importation of nuclear fuel, which does not involve building a 
local fuel fabrication and enrichment plant, 2) local manufacturing of nuclear fuel, which 
involves obtaining a local fuel fabrication and enrichment plant, and 3) a combination of both 
options (see Table 1). It should be noted that KSA signed NPT in 1988, SQP in 2005 and CSA in 
2009, and has not sign AP (see Table 1).  
4. Towards Implementation of SLC in KSA 
Newcomer states like KSA must maintain appropriate safeguard agreements to provide 
the IAEA with the needed tools for appropriate safeguards verification. The generic safeguards 
objective remains the same for all states with CSA agreements. However, SLA will depend i.a. 
on the fuel cycle option and facilities in the concerned state. Under the implementation of 
KACARE’s planned nuclear power plant deployment, the required nuclear fuel must be initially 
imported because of the long-term investment required to manufacture nuclear fuel. Considering 
the above circumstance, an example of SLA for KSA’s current outlook is illustrated in Fig. 1. 
The diversion/acquisition path analysis is primarily determined by detecting all plausible paths of 
diversion or misuse (of declared and undeclared nuclear material, activities, and facility or LOF).  
The determination of the diversion/acquisition paths analysis for KSA is based on the 
planned nuclear power facilities, or LOF that the nuclear materials may be shipped to and stored, 
processed, and used. Thus, the diversion/acquisition paths analysis should include, but not 
limited to: 1) imported/stored fresh fuel; 2) in core fuel; 3) reactors spent fuel; 4) spent fuel 
shipped to or stored in local repository; 5) spent fuel shipped for outside reprocessing. After the 
determination of diversion/acquisition paths analysis, the technical objectives are established and 
prioritized to identify the applicable safeguards measures. The technical objectives include, but 
are not limited to the detection of diversion/misuse of fresh/spent fuel, undeclared plutonium 
production in the reactor, and diversion of core fuel (see Fig. 1). The identified safeguards 
measures include, but are not limited to the nuclear material accountancy, design information 
verification, inspection, evaluation of safeguards relevant information (which includes 
information from the state itself, IAEA safeguards activities, open sources and third parties), and 
verification of state’s import/export declaration.  
Based on the developed SLA, the safeguards activities would be planned, conducted, and 
evaluated. Once IAEA completes the necessary safeguards measurements and evaluations, the 
safeguards conclusion can be drawn. This will also enable IAEA to ascertain that the declared 
nuclear materials remain dedicated to peaceful nuclear activities after the needed measurements 
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and evaluations have been completed. For the completeness of state declarations and to provide 
credible assurances of the absence of undeclared nuclear materials and activities, the IAEA will 
be required to seek clarification from the state to draw a sound safeguards conclusion. For the 
broader safeguards conclusion of the absence of undeclared nuclear activities, KSA is 
encouraged to conclude AP with the IAEA because it provides the IAEA with broader access 
and information. This will foster KSA-level nuclear transparency and attract and secure long-
term nuclear cooperation between KSA and developed states, which is essential for successful 
deployment of civilian nuclear power programs. However, if KSA considers manufacturing the 
nuclear fuel, the development of SLA must be expanded to include all of the involved fuel 
manufacturing plants, for example conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication plants. 
Figure 1: An Example of SLA for KSA’s Current Outlook.* 
 
    *, Diversion/Acquisition Path Analysis, Technical Objectives, and Safeguards Measures are limited. 
As part of a successful deployment of SLC, KSA has the responsibility to cooperate with 
IAEA and foster transparency with IAEA as well as the nuclear community. When KSA’s first 
reactors are operational, KSA will be required to have an adequate SSAC in place to carry out 
safeguards declarations. Therefore, it is recommended that KSA improve and expand its SSAC 
to adequately meet safeguards responsibilities. The structure of KSA’s nuclear program places 
the responsibility with KACARE. The function of KSA’s SSAC should be performed by 
KACARE. Adequate employees of KACARE should be trained extensively in nuclear materials 
accountancy. Such train would be performed through IAEA and it will improve technical 
capabilities of KSA in SSAC/RSAC.  The employees involved could be responsible for reporting 
small quantities of nuclear material to the IAEA prior to full deployment of the KSA nuclear 
program.  
Diversion/Acquisition Paths Technical Objectives Safeguards Measures
- Imported/Stored Fresh
    Fuel.
- In-core Fuel.
- Reactors Spent/Used Fuel.
- Local Shipment of Spent/
   Used Fuel.
- Spent/Used Fuel in Off-
   site Storage or Repository.
- International Shipment of
    Spent/Used Fuel (for
    Storage or Reprocessing).
- Detect Diversion/Misuse of
   Fresh Fuel.
- Detect Diversion of Core
   Fuel.
- Detect Diversion of Fuel
   Shipment.
- Detect Diversion/Misuse of
   Spent/Used Fuel.
- Detect Undeclared Plutonium
   Production.
- Nuclear Material Accountancy.
- Design Information 
   Verification.
- Inspection.
- Verification of State’s Import/
   Export Declarations.
- Evaluation of Safeguards
   Relevant Information.
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5. Conclusion  
 The goal of this work is to investigate the influence of SLC on newcomers, with KSA as 
case study. The investigation approaches SLC from the newcomer’s perspective, with a view to 
determine critical factors impacting newcomers toward successful implementation of SLC. 
Critical looks at the development of SLA with its involved aspects (such as state-level objectives 
and state-specific factors) are employed to reconcile KSA’s outlook with the IAEA’s safeguards 
framework/agreements. SLC refers to implementing safeguards in a manner that considers a 
state’s nuclear and nuclear-related activities and capabilities as a whole, within the scope of the 
state’s safeguards agreement [GOV/2013/38 and GOV/2014/41]. SLC involves developing the 
SLA, which mainly addresses the generic safeguards objectives common to all states with CSA 
agreements as well as the state-level objectives. The state-level safeguards objectives are 
established on the basis of paths determined by performing the diversion/acquisitions path 
analysis considering the state-specific factors.  
 The impact of SLC implementation on newcomer states include sufficient cooperation 
between the IAEA and the newcomer states, greater confidence specifically regarding sensitive 
nuclear plants (such as conversion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication plants), higher state-level of 
nuclear transparency, and improved capabilities of SSAC. The implementation of SLC helps 
build confidence through greater transparency, specifically in sensitive nuclear plants. KSA 
plans to add at least 18 GWe through nuclear technology by 2040. KSA should improve and 
expand its SSAC to meet the new safeguards responsibilities. The type of safeguard agreements 
in place will eventually impact safeguards verifications performed by the IAEA, and will be 
reflected in the nature of the drawn safeguards conclusion. Thus, KSA must maintain appropriate 
safeguard agreements to provide the IAEA with the needed tools for appropriate safeguards 
verification. For a broader safeguards conclusion, KSA is encouraged to sign the AP to equip the 
IAEA with the needed tool of broader access and information. This will foster state-level nuclear 
transparency as well as long-term nuclear cooperation between KSA and developed states, both 
of which are essential for successful deployment of its civilian nuclear power program.  
One of the keys for successful implementation of a civilian nuclear power program is 
compliance with acceptable safeguards commitments. Therefore, KSA must develop its nuclear 
infrastructure considering the latest developments to maintain the highest level of safeguards, 
security, and nonproliferation. KSA must also raise the confidence of the international nuclear 
community in its planned program through nuclear transparency. The implementation of SLC is 
a good start towards the necessary safeguards compliance and nuclear transparency.   
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